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IU THE

SUPP~:.:_s

COURT OF THE

STA'II: OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respo~dent,

-vs-

Case No.
15920

ROBERT ALEX VALDEZ,
Defendant-Appella~t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEME!'iT OF TH:C: :'lATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant

~as

convicted of the crime of negligent

homicide by a jury in the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION I:.J THE LOl\TER COURT
On February 9, 1978, after preliminary hearing,
appellant was char·Jed by

i~fornation

with second degree murder

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953)

(R.lO).

A

jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third Judicial
District on June 12, 1978, and the jury returned a verdict on
June 14, 1978, of guilty of the lesser included offense of
negli<Jent homicide (R.70).

On June 15, 1978, the appellant

was sentenced to serve cne year in the Salt Lake County Jail.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of
guilty rendered by the jury below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
on December 11, 1977, the appellant shot Melvin
Gregory Miller to death in Salt Lake County.

The facts

leading up to this event are as follows:
The daughter of the appellant, Debbie Valez
(R.l28,129), was not living at home with her parents on
December 11, 1977.

However, on that day, around 4:00 a.m.

she entered her parents' home, took a set of car keys,
drove away in her father's car.

Debbie then met and

a~

pic~

up the deceased, Melvin Miller, around 8:00 a.m. that

sa~

morning (R.l30).
On the morning of December 11, 19 7 7, th(, appellan
noticed that his car was missing (R.237).

After finding

that the keys were also missing and realizing that his

d~

would have barked if a stranger had taken the car, the
appellant assumed that his daughter had taken the car (R.;
The appellant arranged to have his

brother-in-1~

Bill LeFevre, assist him in looking for the car, but befor
leaving, the appellant armed himself with a gun (R.238,2Y
which he had purchased while working part-time as a securi
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gua_

at Wehb

bul~~~s

Secur~~

in the gun

'?.229).

The =.opellant put

?."39), and left

veh~=~e and his dau~~~~r.

by ~~5 brother-in-la~.

~J

~is

find his

The aopella~t was accompan!ed

Ap~ellant

stated that he took the

gun ~~th hi~ as a ms=.~s of scaring his daughter (R.256,
257,r3).
At approxir=.~ely 1J:40 a.m., the appellant's vehicle
,_-~=i:-~it"·

was s::otted in the
(R.:2?).
Whe:-.

~he

bei~=

tha::

Bill

LeFe~=~

appellant

driven by a
~twas

LeF~~=e

5

~as

of North Temple and Third \iest
::he first tJ spot the car.

=.-.,- ::-:is car he coul:: see that it \·:as

b~=-=~

~elvin

man,

=-~are::

stopped

light

Miller (R.241),

a~d

(R.~32,133,215).

stopped his -:=.rand the appellant got out (?.215).
The appella:-_ ~ -.-:alked to his car, holding his gun

in

~-=~h

hands

(R.l3~

The =.::pellant openec
lay~:-;

down on the

:::--_~n

He

11il~~=

Mil

~sr

"Ta>~

told

~1iller

and ::old
~::-:e

~iller

to get out (?.242).

car door and saw his daughter

~=-=senger's

side of the car (R.242).

::: c;o t'J the back of the car (R. 242).

obeyed the c::-:--a:-:d.
at this time =.:-::

The aopellant had his

.'!il~er

it easy with :; 0 _=.:: thi:-:g."

als: Etated that he

~:-=~gh::

She ::ok the car."

=.=so).

g~:-:

on

was telling the appellant to
(R. 242).

~iller

saii,

The

appella~t

"Take it easy.
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The two men walked to the back of the

c~r

and

the appellant grabbed Hiller on the shoulder and ordered
him to "just lean on the car."

(R.243).

The appellant

then looked back at his daughter, who was inside the
appellant's car.

At that time, while he was looking at

Debbie, his gun went off and Miller fell to the ground
(R.243).

The bullet had gone through Miller's head and

had lodged in his hat band (R.l54,155,188).

Debbie

Valdez then drove away in her father's car (R.l36).
At the trial, defense counsel requested that
the court instruct the jury to the effect that the

appe~

lant was justified in threatening or using force against
2nother if he reasonably believed that such force was
necessary to defend himself or third person against such
others' imminent use of unlawful force and that he was
justified in using non-deadly force if he reasonably
believed that such force was necessary to prevent or
eliminate criminal interference with his personal
property {R.37).

This request was denied on June 14,

1978, and the appellant cites this denial as error.
The appellant also cites as plain error Instruct
17 and 17C (R.55,56,59), which were given to the jury.
Appellant did not object to their use at trial.
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POINT I
THE T~I~L COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING THE
APP ELI~C; ':? 1 S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION SINCE
SUCH :r;-;sTRUCT ION liAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
FACTS.
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise that
a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to
~resent

his theory of the case to the jury.

This right is

not absolute, hm·1ever, and has been modified by statute and
case law.

Case law dealing with requested instructions,
Uta~

State v. Close, 23
v. McCarthy, 25

C~ah

2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972); State

2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971); State v.

Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738
a defense theory

~ust

(1947), indicates that

be supported by a certain quantum of

evidence before an instruction will be given.
right is not

unli~ited

Because the

the trial court is not necessarily

bound to give all instructions relating to defense theories
just because

the~·

are requested or because they are character-

ized by the de:endant as reflecting his theory of the case.
Therefo~e,

if a defendant's theory of the case is

all theory and no evidence,or so unreasonable based on the
evidence presented that it does not satisfy the requirements
of a defense, no instruction thereon is required.
The

ap~ellant

requested the following instruction:
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The law provides to persons charged with
criminal homicide absolute defenses to the
charge of criminal homicide and by_law,
justifies the death of the person lnvolved.
If after you have reviewed the evidence in
this matter and feel that the criteria for
these defenses exist, the law mandates that
you must find the defendant not guilty.
A person is justified in threatening or
using force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to defend himself or third
person against such others imminent use of
unlawful force; however, a person is justified
in using force which is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury only if
he reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or a third person.
A person is justified in using force,
other than deadly force, against another when
and to the extent that he reasonably believes
that force is necessary to prevent or terminate
criminal interference with his personal proper0
,:'C. 37, 38).

The facts do not support the instruction.

The

second paragraph of the requested instruction indicates
that force is justified to defend against unlawful force.
In the instant case, the deceased did not show any signs
of resistance and did not use force to retain possession
of the appellant's vehicle.

On the appellant's demand,

t'

deceased was cooperative and obeyed the demand by getti~
out of the car.

At no time did the deceased use any ki~

force to retain possession of the vehicle.

There was no

threat of death or serious bodily injury to the appellant
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to

Lc~evre,

therefore, the appellant was not justified in

using deadly force to obtain his property.
The third paragraph of the requested instruction
states, in compliance with Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-406 (1953),

that non-deadly force is justified when used to terminate
criminal interference.

This section of the requested

instruction is inconsistent with the facts of the instant
case,

since the type of force used by appellant was deadly.

The Utah Supreme Court held, in State v. Nielsen, 544 P.2d
489

(Ctah 1965), that a gun is a deadly weapon whether it is

loadec or not.

In addition, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-l-60l(a)

(Supp. 1975), defines a deadly weapon as:
Anything that in the manner of its
use or intended use is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury.
In the instant case, implementation of a deadly
weapon constituted the use of deadly force which is not
sanctioned by the instruction in question or by Utah law.
The lower court, therefore, correctly refused to
instr~ct

the jury as

t~e

appellant requested since the

instruction was an incorrect statement of the law as
applied to the present case and could have confused or
misled the jury.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROH RAISING
ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
REGARDING THE USE OF INSTRUCTIONS 17
AND l7C.
The appellant contends that the instructions on
excusable negligence and criminal negligence created a
disparity in the law in that the jury was not specifican
instructed on the issue of simple negligence.

At trial,

however, the appellant's counsel failed to object to the
instructions given to the jury and did not request an
instruction on the degree of negligence required to convic
the appellant.

Failure to do so precludes the raising of

these issues on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court held, in HendNR
Kibbe, 97 s.ct. 1730, 431 u.s. 407

(1977), that orderly

procedure requires that views as to how the jury should bc
instructed be presented to the trial judge and that it wm
indeed be a rare case in which an improper instruction wot
justify reversal of a criminal conviction when, in fact, r
objection has been made at the trial court level.
United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697

(CA 10, 1'

also held that objection to an instruction made for the f:
time on appeal is untimely.
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In Stutt' v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (1976}, this
Coc:rt held that failure to object to an instruction and
furnish a proper request precludes any contention of error.
This Court also stated that the requirement of an objection
gives an "opportunity for the court to correct or to fill
in any inadequacy in the instructions so that the jury may
consider the case on a proper basis.

In order to accomplish

this purpose, the rule should be adhered to."

Kazda, at 192.

In State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112
(1977), this Court added this exception:

that the rule

announced in Kazda would not apply if the giving or failure
to give certain instructions is so "palpable as obviously
to reflect prejudice amounting to a denial of due process."
Id. at 1113.
Respondent submits that Instructions 17 and 17C
(R.55,56,59), were not prejudicial to the defendant and
therefore, did not constitute plain error.

First, the

appellant was originally charged with second degree murder;
the instructions in issue acted in his favor and were not
prejudicial Lo him since they constituted defenses to the
original charge.

The appellant was given the benefit of an

opportunity to be excused from any criminal punishment for
his act (Instruction l7C, R.59}, and the additional benefit
of having the jury deterfTline if the appellant was guilty of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a lesser offense than that of second degree murder
(Instruction 17, R.55,56).
The facts support these two instructions:
human being died at the hand of the plaintiff.

A

The

court, however, realized that loss of life does not
necessarily call for retribution if the appellant acted
reasonably.

For this reason, the instruction on

excusable negligence was included.

It instructed the

jury to find the appellant innocent if he acted as a
reasonable man would under like circumstances.

Therefou,

the instruction was not prejudicial to the appellant.
The facts also indicate that the death of Melvin
·hller was not intentional

(R. 245).

Other facts shov; that

the. jury could have found that the appellant acted
negligently in using deadly force in a situation where oo
force was exerted by the deceased.

The nature of the casE

that is, that a human being died, justified the higher
standard of negligence required to find the appellant
guilty of criminal negligence.

The jury had to find

th~

the appellant acted in a manner which constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
man would have exercised under like circumstances.

The

jury found such a deviation and concluded that the appel1
had acted unreasonably under the circumstances.

Had the
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jury not found a gross deviation from such a standard of
care, appellant may have been acquitted if the elements
of second degree murder could not have been met.
Thus, the jury was informed that the law would
excuse an act which caused the death of another human being
if the actor had acted reasonably.

They were also informed

as to the result required by law if they found that the
actor had been unreasonable.

The jury was properly informed

of the law favorable to the appellant.

The appellant was

not unduly prejudiced by these instructions to the extent that
he was denied due process of law.

Therefore, appellant

is precluded from raising issues regarding the instructions
for the first time on appeal.

Hendersen v. Kibbe, supra;

State v. Kazda, supra; State v. International Amusement,
supra; and State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978).
CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant has a right to present his
theory of the case to the jury under proper circumstances.
The obligation of the trial court to instruct on that
theory is guided by the evidence presented, not a defendant's
churacterization of his theory.

The facts of this case do

not support the appellant's theory that deadly force was
threatened bul not used since the facts show that Melvin
MillGr died as a result of the use of deadly force.
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The instructions given to the jury on excusable
negligence and criminal negligence were not prejudicial
to th~ appellant.
Th~

In fact, they were favorable to him.

appellant therefore cannot contend error as to such

instructions on appeal due to the fact that his counsel
failed to object or to request ,tdditional instructions
at the trial court level.
Respondent, therefore, submits that appellant's
contentions are without merit and prays that the Court
will affirm the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury
below.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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